THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION

AN COIMISIÚN UM ATHCHÓIRIÚ AN DLÍ

(LRC 37–1991)

REPORT

ON

THE INDEXATION OF FINES

IRELAND

The Law Reform Commission

Ardilaun Centre, 111 St Stephen's Green, Dublin 2

© Copyright The Law Reform Commission 1991

First Published October 1991

THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION

The Law Reform Commission was established by section 3 of the Law Reform Commission Act, 1975 on 20th October, 1975. It is an independent body consisting of a President and four other members appointed by the Government.

The Commissioners at present are:

The Hon Mr. Justice Ronan Keane, Judge of the High Court, President;

John F. Buckley, Esq., B.A, LL.B., Solicitor;

William R. Duncan, Esq., M.A., F.T.C.D., Barrister-at-Law, Associate

Professor of Law, University of Dublin;

Ms. Maureen Gaffney; B.A., M.A., (Univ. of Chicago), Senior Psychologist,

Eastern Health Board; Research Associate, University of Dublin;

Simon P. O'Leary, Esq., B.A., Barrister-at-Law.

The Commission's programme of law reform, prepared in consultation with the Attorney General, was approved by the Government and copies were laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas on 4th January, 1977. The Commission has formulated and submitted to the Taoiseach or the Attorney General thirty-six Reports containing proposals for the reform of the law. It has also published eleven Working Papers, five Consultation Papers and Annual Reports. Details will be found on pp93–96.

William Binchy, Esq., B.A., B.C.L., LL.M., Barrister-at-Law, is Research Counsellor to the Commission.

Ms. Suzanne Egan, B.C.L., LL.M., Barrister-at-Law, Ms. Clíona Kimber, LL.B., LL.M., Ms. Julianne O'Leary, B.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law and Mr. Oisín Quinn, B.C.L., LL.M., are Research Assistants.

Further information from:

The Secretary,

The Law Reform Commission,

Ardilaun Centre,

111 St. Stephen's Green,

Dublin 2.

Telephone: 715699

This Report was submitted on 30th October 1991 to the Attorney General, Mr Harold Whelehan, S.C., under Section 4(2)(c) of the Law Reform Commission Act 1975, and, at the Attorney General's request, is being made available to the public at this stage while the proposals it contains are being considered in the relevant Government Departments.

INTRODUCTION

1.

On 6th March 1987, pursuant to s4(2)(c) of the Law Reform Commission Act 1975, the then Attorney General requested the Commission to undertake to conduct research on, and to formulate and submit to him proposals for the reform of, sentencing policy in general. The indexation of fines to inflation was singled out for individual attention. The opportunity was also taken to consider the issue of means-related fines, which had been intended to be treated in the forthcoming Consultation Paper on Sentencing Policy.¹. To assist us in coming to our conclusions, we circulated a Discussion Paper among lawyers and other persons expert in the enforcement of the law. We are very grateful for the observations and suggestions we received, and express our thanks to the following contributors:

Commissioner Patrick Culligan, Garda Siochana;

Mr James Hamilton, Attorney General's Office;

Mr Brian Lenehan, Department of Finance;

Mr Paddy McDonald, Central Statistics Office;

Mr Michael Quinlan, County Registrar, Dublin Circuit Court;

Judge Peter Smithwick, President of the District Court.

This Report contains proposals based on the original Discussion Paper and the subsequent exchange of views. However, the Commission is solely

responsible for the contents of the Report.

2.

Fines are the most commonly imposed penalty in the countries of the developed world, and the reasons for their appeal are clear. There has been a loss of faith in prisons as a means either of deterring or of rehabilitating offenders, and fines are seen as an effective alternative to short-term imprisonment for less serious offences. Also, fines are cost-effective compared to other criminal penalties. They bring in revenue which helps underwrite the criminal justice system, while forcing the offender to repay society in some way for the damage he has caused. Third, fines are flexible – they can be adjusted in individual cases both to the seriousness of the offence and to the offender's means. Finally, fines are easily remissible, as they can be repaid in the event of injustice.

3.

These advantages are, however, dependent on the good design of a country's system for the imposition of fines. Some problems are apparent in the Irish system. Widely differing fines may be permitted for offences of similar gravity, simply because the relevant legislation was enacted at different times. Furthermore, fine maxima set out in legislation of any age are eroded each year by inflation. The net effect of these two factors is to give an impression of inconsistency and injustice, and also one of reduced deterrence and denunciation of crime. As inflation also devalues revenues collected, this advantage of fines is also undermined. At the same time, the number of persons imprisoned for fine default is disturbingly high, which suggests that the system at the moment is insufficiently flexible.

4.

All these considerations point to a pressing need for reform of the fines system. Such reform should:

5.

There are also constitutional considerations. Article 38, sections 2 and 5 of the Constitution make varying provision for the trial of minor and non-minor offences. The former may be tried summarily in the District Court, in certain circumstances, for the latter, jury trial is compulsory. The Supreme Court decision in The State (Rollinson) v Kelly² suggests that the maximum

fine for an offence is an important indicator of its minor or non-minor status and that the courts will take account of the changing value of money in assessing this. Thus, an offence with a fine maximum of £500 would have been non-minor in 1962, but minor in 1982. This must be undesirable, and is presumably contrary to the legislative intention. This state of affairs must give impetus to the scheme of reform just outlined (and especially to the achievement of object (b)).

6.

Two further ancillary issues should also briefly be mentioned. First, the scale of businesses, investment, etc. has expanded at a rate which outstrips even inflation, so that many enterprises may have become almost immune even to inflation-adjusted fines. Also, prices have not risen uniformly in all fields – some have plummeted, others have soared. Whatever scheme is adopted should be sufficiently flexible to take account of these features of the modern economy.

7.

Broadly speaking, there are two possible avenues of reform. A standard fine system is one whereby all old fine maxima are given an up to date value e.g. £25 in an Act of 1922, and £250 in one of 1972, are both given a 1992 value of £500. This helps achieve object (a). Object (b) is attained by placing all fines in suitable categories (perhaps five, A to E) whose maximum value is then periodically increased; or by applying a multiplier (which is changed every year) to the modernised 1992 values to get the equivalent value for subsequent years.

8.

A variable fine system (or unit fine or day-fine system) imposes fines in terms of units of gravity, whose monetary value is in each case dictated by the means of the offender. This directly addresses object (c), but achieves object (b) indirectly as well, as people's incomes vary roughly in line with inflation. A modernising process like that described above would still be necessary in respect of object (a) – up to date values would then be equated with a certain number of fine units in order to operate the system.

9.

The scheme of the Report which follows is this. Section I will flesh out in greater detail the problems and possible solutions here outlined. Section II will examine the means by which fine values could be indexed to inflation. Section III will discuss the features, advantages and disadvantages of standard fine systems; Section IV will similarly address variable fine systems. In all cases, experience in other countries will be adverted to, while we remain mindful of the unique features of the Irish Constitution and criminal justice system.

SECTION 1: FINES AND THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION

10.

At a time of disquiet about the efficacy of imprisonment as a rehabilitative measure (and of some agnosticism about its superiority over other measures in point of deterrence),¹ the advantages of fines are considerable.

In the first place, fines are said to be “penologically effective” as an alternative to short-term imprisonment (with its perceived adverse effect on recidivism rates).² For many categories of offenders, the incapacitative function of imprisonment (to protect society) is unnecessary, the exposure to prison and criminal culture deleterious and the outlay of expenditure involved, as a result, disproportionately high. In such cases, non-custodial options which are of penal effect, such as fines, are preferable.

Secondly, the imposition of fines has economic benefits (while imprisonment and most other non-custodial penalties entail very substantial costs).

Revenues can help underwrite the expenses of the courts system,³ while the fine involves the offender paying back to the community something in return for the damage he has done.

Thirdly, a fines system system is (or can be) a flexible instrument of legislative and judicial sentencing policy: in the individual case, the fine can be adjusted both to the gravity of the offence and to the offender's means. This allows courts to adhere to the principle of equality of impact of penalties on offenders in different circumstances. (See below). If properly assessed, a fine can punish the offender without damaging his 'opportunities for employment or his family responsibilities.

Finally, the fine is easily remissible in that it can be repaid in the event of injustice.

Against fines, it may be said that while they can be retributive and deterrent, they are not reformative in a positive way. Also, it is difficult to ensure that a fine is paid by the defendant himself without causing unwarranted hardship to his dependants.⁴ In general, the objective disadvantages of a fines system are few.⁵ However, most of the advantages are contingent upon the system's good design. An inflexible system loses most of the advantages listed above.

11.

Disparities in fine maxima for offences of equivalent gravity, enacted at different times, create an impression of inconsistency and injustice (though this can be equally true of other penal options). The number of persons

imprisoned for fine-default is also disturbing in some jurisdictions.⁶ It indicates that fines imposed may be too great a burden on the poorer sections of society, and that a proper measure of flexibility has not been achieved – the response of the courts to individual circumstances is of an ad hoc nature, under the District Court Rules 1948, which state that the means of the offender should be taken into account when determining the value of a fine.⁷ Also, imprisonment for default negates the advantages of fines over custodial penalties.

12.

But of most immediate and obvious concern, and most simple of solution, is the eroding effect of inflation upon the value of legislatively prescribed maximum (or minimum) fines. At common law, courts have a discretion to impose fines upon conviction for any misdemeanour (but not for felonies, with the exception of manslaughter),⁸ and there is no limit to the value of the fine which may be imposed (subject only to restrictions on the competence of particular courts).⁹ Fines are, however, more normally provided for by statute. Many of our criminal statutes are of some age, and, because they are clear and workable, have survived without amendment. An unfortunate corollary of this is the fact that the monetary penalties which were attached to these offences when they were created remain unchanged as well. Alternatively, the proposed revision of entire statutes can make it seem unnecessary to amend the penalties for old offences in the meantime.¹⁰

13.

Courts cannot impose maximum or near maximum fines unless the offence is one of extreme gravity, even when inflation has very much reduced the value of that maximum. This naturally must reduce fines' deterrent effect, so that even in respect of offences for which the chances of detection are high,¹¹ the penalty imposed upon conviction may be so slight as to be a negligible component in the criminal's calculations. The fine can come to be

regarded as an incidental aggravation, as a tax on criminal activity or as an inexpensive licence to infringe the law.¹²

14.

These and other aspects of the problem are illustrated by the following excerpt from the Whitaker Report¹³:

Even in comparatively recent legislation like the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956, the maximum monetary penalty which can be imposed is £100, which must have been only a minor inconvenience to those involved in the spate of very lucrative, unlawful lotteries in the 1980's. Such travesties also have the effect of alienating public opinion from the law.

15.

It has also been suggested that the courts, frustrated by their inability to impose appropriate fines, will have recourse to other less suitable measures in order to achieve some equivalence between sentence and offence. It would be a great shame if resort were had to short-term imprisonment merely because of defects in a system whose chief advantage is its diversion of offenders from the prison system.¹⁵ However, the impression of those involved in the Irish court system is that this problem has not arisen.¹⁶

16.

There is also a problem of the loss of real revenue as fines lose their value.¹⁷ For a calculation of this loss, based on Department of Justice figures, see Appendix I(ii).

17.

These considerations provide an entirely pragmatic incentive to reform the present legislative practice of stating a specific monetary penalty for each offence created, which has no in-built capacity for inflation. Another practical reason for a general reform is that pressure is building up in a number of areas to put individual indexation provisions in new offence-creating legislation. In recent years, such a step was mooted in the Social Welfare Bill, the Finance Bill, the Central Bank Bill and the Statistics Bill.¹⁸ Such a proliferation of possibly different indexes would create needless confusion.

18.

The constitutional implications of this state of affairs must also be considered. There are at least some grounds for concern that the intention of the legislature is being defeated, while the letter of its enactments is being observed, by the “real” decrease in penalties due to inflation – a fact of which it must be possible to take judicial notice. The question whether an Irish Court would heed such an argument for a purposive interpretation of fine imposing enactments (the intention arguably being to punish the offender to a certain degree, only incidentally stated in contemporary monetary terms, rather than to enjoin for all time a monetary amount which has no fixed objective value) is moot. Such a case is unlikely to arise unless money begins to gain in value (so that fixed fines become progressively more burdensome),¹⁹ but would in any event be liable to be viewed with some scepticism from the Bench. The present state of affairs does, however, present another argument for legislative, rather than judicial, action.

19.

There are also more immediate causes for concern. Article 38.2 of the Constitution states:

This, read with Article 38.5, has the effect:

This means that certain specified indictable offences (e.g. larceny of property worth less than £200) are triable summarily (with the accused's agreement, upon being informed of his right to jury trial) where the court is “of opinion that the facts proved or alleged constitute a minor offence fit to be so tried”.²⁰ It also means that indictable offences which are “non-minor” cannot be tried summarily.²¹ As will be seen, the primary indicator of the status of an offence is the severity of the penalty which attaches to it, but other factors are also relevant.

20.

The effect of inflation in the first respect is probably to cast many or all of the occasions of the commission of the relevant offences into the minor category (at least in light of the maximum fine which can be imposed). This result is not perhaps unwelcome in itself. The fact that a greater than anticipated number of accused can avail themselves of the option of summary trial (which is cheaper and speedier than trial before a jury) is hardly to be regretted. But this can be at the cost of some conceptual confusion in the law. Considerations other than the penalty include the moral quality of the acts involved in the offence's commission and public opinion at the time of the measure's enactment.²² Fines set at that time would presumably reflect these considerations, but must of necessity depart from them over the years due to inflationary pressures, so that the “indicators” of the status (minor or non-minor) of a particular infraction may point in different directions. This problem becomes more acute when the specified fine loses any real equivalence to any other available penalty. For example, section 44 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956 sets as a maximum penalty for breach of section 4(1)(c) a fine of up to £100 and/or 3 months imprisonment.²³

21.

The effect of this confusion becomes very serious in respect of offences which are summary only; should they embrace acts, or penalties, which are not “minor”, the entire offence-creating section may founder on constitutional grounds. This occurred in Kostan v Ireland and the Attorney General,²⁴ when McWilliam J found section 221 of the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act 1959 to be repugnant to the Constitution. The penalty specified was a maximum fine of £100 with the mandatory forfeiture of the catch and fishing-gear here

valued at £102,040, which no one can deny is severe, and must have been vastly in excess of any exaction contemplated by the legislature.²⁵ This is an example not of inflationary erosion of fines but of the distortion induced by the change in the scale of many business (and criminal) operations in a modern economy (which problem must also be addressed in this paper).

22.

The intrusion of inflation upon the workings of the fines system has caused some confusion on the Bench. In the High Court in State (Rollinson) v Kelly,²⁶ Cannon J, assessing the seriousness of a fine of £500 enjoined by section 25(2) of the Finance Act 1926, had regard to the value of money at the time of enactment, and to a District Justice's salary during that period (£1,000 p.a.). He concluded that the fine must then have been regarded by the legislature and judiciary (and indeed until the 1960's) as a very severe penalty. In Melting v O Mathghamhna,²⁷ Kingsmill-Moore J²⁸ and O Dalaigh J²⁹ (both dissenting on the conclusion, but not on the reasoning) related the severity of a fine to its effect in 1922.

23.

This approach did not, however, find favour with the Supreme Court in the appeal from Gannon J's decision in Rollinson.³⁰ While his reasoning would reflect the initial intention of the legislature with regard to seriousness, however outmoded, the Supreme Court would allow it to be overtaken by inflation. Griffin J suggested³¹ that a fine “fairly considerably in excess” of £500 would still be minor; Henchy and Hederman JJ referred to the problem of inflation: £100 in Melling was not serious, in 1962, and this was equivalent to £900 in 1984, so that a fine of £500 could safely be imposed after summary conviction. The penalty prescribed may be viewed with reference to the time of the relevant conviction. O'Higgins CJ dissented, holding the offence not to be minor, and urging that the penalty be viewed in the light of circumstances at the time of enactment.

24.

It is clear that neither of these approaches is satisfactory. The latter is unrealistic (and would cause the seriousness of a number of fines, all of the same amount, to vary according to the time of their prescription), while the former disregards the parliamentary intention. It also seems clear that a system of indexation of fines could suitably resolve this conflict, allowing the original gravity of the offence to be maintained relative to the changing value of money.

25.

It thus seems reasonably clear that some scheme should be devised in order to restore and then maintain the real value of the fine maxima stated in criminal legislation. The design of such a scheme is not the simple task it might first appear. A basic choice must be made between what will be termed “standard fine” and “variable fine” systems.

26.

Under a standard fine system, such as exists at present, set fine maxima apply across the board to all persons convicted of relevant offences (with possible discretionary reductions due to inability to pay). Fine maxima can be kept up to date either by being placed in categories, or subjected to multipliers, which are adjusted according to fluctuations in money values or income levels, for example.

27.

On the other hand, variable fine (or day-fine) systems calculate fines by reference to two components: the gravity of the offence and the means of the person sentenced. A convict may be fined 100 units, for example, for an infraction of a certain gravity. Each unit will be a prescribed fraction of his income (eg 1/1000). There is no need for indexation in such a system, as it adjusts automatically to differing levels of income over time, as well as between different persons.

28.

It is worth noting, at the outset, that adopting a variable fine system, while subject to considerable problems, avoids three difficult questions which are posed by the standard fine system, which will be mentioned here, and considered in due course.

29.

Before considering the arguments for and against a standard fine system and the various options available within such a system, the choice of index will be discussed.

SECTION 2: CHOOSING AN INDEX

30.

The most commonly proposed index upon which to base an indexation scheme is the consumer price index (CPI), from which derives the rate of inflation and the tables on the relative value of money. (See Appendix II, Table (i)).

31.

The several statisticians' disputes on the calculation of such indexes cannot properly concern us here. But there does exist an important question of policy. It has been suggested¹ that an entirely different index be employed. Figures on changes in levels of disposable income would, on this thesis, be fairer to the fine payer.

32.

The argument in favour of this position is not difficult to appreciate. The index on income is meant to be a better indicator of the finee's ability to pay (and of the impact of the fine as a penalty) than a rate of inflation which may outstrip incomes. Writing in the early 1980's, when memories of the “stagflation” of the 1970's were still fresh in Britain, it is understandable that Ashworth should have proposed this alternative, if the measure of the severity of a penalty is its impact on the citizen.

33.

However, such an approach would have served the fine-payer very ill indeed were it in place in Ireland in the middle and later 1980's. “The most appropriate measure of incomes accruing to the residents of a country is Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI).² Central Statistics Office tables

show GNDI to have increased considerably throughout the latter part of the decade. Even after inflation is taken into account, there was a 13.7% real increase in GNDI from 1982–1988 (See Appendix II (ii)). This should reflect an increased capacity to pay fines among the general population.³

34.

But it must be decided what is meant by the maintenance of the penal impact of fines. Is it sufficient that they take the same effective “amount” of money from pockets (i.e. that amount of money which in 1960, 1990, or whenever, would buy a certain quantity of goods from the basket from which the CPI is calculated) at all times? Or should fines take account of real increases in the wealth of the population, which brings about a dilution in the penal effect of monetary exactions quite separate from that caused by inflation? One might say that this is the least that could be done in a standard indexation system with no provision for variable fines.

35.

This, however, has significant drawbacks. While the CPI and inflation affects everyone fairly uniformly (if the CSO Household Budget Survey is in fact a realistic representation of most citizens' chief areas of expenditure), fluctuations in personal incomes do not necessarily affect all people equally. No satisfactory estimates of individual disposable income exist beyond a per capita deduction from the estimates of national income.⁴ Kirwan and McGilvray add⁵ that very little data exists to allow an accurate assessment of the degree of inequality of distribution of personal income in Ireland (or, presumably, of relative rates of growth in income in the various sections of society).

36.

Clearly, however, Ashworth's proposal is designed to help those on lower incomes, and some conclusions can be drawn from figures on increases in various social welfare payments. No consistent policy is evident in the pattern of social welfare increases during the 1980's save one of allowing social welfare entitlements to stay abreast of inflation (not always achieved). Efforts have been made in certain sections to increase payments ahead of inflation in order to effect some real improvement in the financial position of recipients. There have been no steps of this kind sufficiently general and sustained to allow us to presume the continuance of such policies in formulating a suitable index. (See Appendix III). Given the apparent commitment of governments at most times merely to maintain the position of social welfare dependents in real terms, it would seem to base the index on inflation figures.

37.

As the practical difficulties involved in implementing a variable fine system are very considerable, and a standard system is a more likely choice by legislators, the avoidance of an index which might penalise the poor should be a priority. The poor cannot normally expect their position to improve beyond minimal increases in social welfare payments to keep pace with inflation, despite any real growth in overall national income. Consequently, the CPI index, and the tables on relative money values, recommend themselves (even if wealthier people feel a decrease in the impact of fines relative to their incomes in times of income growth).

38.

A further argument for a CPI-based index is that it is already the basis of Capital Gains Tax indexation multipliers. Indexation relief has the effect of eliminating from consideration for Capital Gains Tax purposes the part of the gain from sale of an asset attributable to inflation, so that only the “real” gain is taxed. Otherwise, the effect of inflation would be to make the tax progressively more punitive with the passage of years, just as fines become progressively less so. The cost\market value of an asset on 6 April 1974 (after which date the relief applies) is indexed by reference to the multipliers set out in tabular form in the Capital Gains Tax (Amendment) Act 1978 (See Appendix IV). Regulations are issued for each subsequent year of assessment setting out the multipliers for asset disposals in those later years.

Table A⁶

SAMPLE CALCULATIONS

An asset costing £1000 was acquired in 1964. The value at 6\4\74 was £10,000. The asset was sold in February 1983 for £40,000

39.

The multipliers can be derived from a simple calculation from CSO tables on the relative value of money, as specified by section 3(1) of the 1978 Act. Many of the monies involved in capital gains will be earmarked for types of expenditure and investment which may be subject to altogether different inflationary pressures from goods and services from the household basket. Nonetheless, CPI-based figures have been judged to be the fairest basis for indexation, just as in the present case. More refined systems tend

towards over-complexity.

40.

That such an index already has legislative status is in itself an argument for its adoption in the case in hand. The Consumer Price Index is also the index expressly employed by An Post in its “index-linked” savings schemes, and is used frequently in private agreements for the indexation of payments.⁷ Whether a system is advisable which is quite as exact as that necessary for taxation purposes is a separate question, to be discussed below.

41.

Much of the effect of criminal penalties lies in their perception by the public, and it may be that there is no evenly paced arithmetical progression of deterrence with fine increases. The primary factor in a criminal's calculations, it appears, is the chance of being caught. Where this is low, even very considerable increases in the severity of penalties are of limited deterrent effect. Bentham's principle of parsimony in sentencing – of imposing the minimum punishment consistent with the aims of the penal process – might favour a more considered approach to individual offences and their attendant penalties, and to the need for increases, over an automatic raising of all fines – especially if higher sentences are not found greatly to increase general deterrent effect.⁸

42.

But general deterrence is only one of the possible aims of criminal penalties. Another is the possible incapacitation of criminals (not directly achievable by fines) and another Individual deterrence (from recidivism) – this is difficult to gauge, but there is some evidence that increased fines are of some effect.⁹ Yet another more intangible aim of sentencing is that of retribution. Often caricatured as mere vengeance-seeking, it is better justified as an attempt symbolically to restore the balance disturbed by the commission of the offence. In Hegel's blunt formulation, punishment is the negation of a negation. Implicit in this concept is the notion of desert (quite separate from that of deterrence), and the requirement that sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness of the case. This requires in turn an agreed ranking of the severity of offences and of sentences.

43.

The remarks of Lord Ashley notwithstanding –“There is no rationality in the arithmetic of perception”¹⁰– there would appear to be some rhyme and reason to public views in this respect. A number of surveys have indicated relatively consistent perceptions of sentencing in various sections of the population. Unfortunately, studies were not conducted over time, so

changes in attitudes due to the decline in the value of money have not been gauged. But the surveys suggest such widely held and quite sophisticated opinions on sentencing that there is ground for confidence that attitudes would alter to take account of the creeping effects of inflation.

Table B¹¹

STUDY BY A KAPHARDIS AND DP FARRINGTON ON SUGGESTIONS TO MAGISTRATES ON SEVERITY SCALING

44.

Sebba & Nathan's studies¹² also indicate that a meaningful severity scale is possible. While, there was considerable disagreement on the relationship of offences and sentences between their study groups of prisoners, probation officers, students and police officers, there was a very high correlation between them with respect to the relative weight of sentences:

Table C

The high degree of consensus again indicates that social perceptions are finely tuned and that the monetary amounts in the above equations would change with time.

45.

Sebba & Nathan's conclusion is that it should therefore be possible to establish a criminal penalties code which would be adjusted in line with changes in perception. That, however, would be problematical. Great as is the consensus expressed in Sebba's survey, there has been very little sustained study of this issue. For Sebba's proposals to be adopted, there should first be:

The first requirement is lacking at present; the second, would seem almost impossible of complete satisfaction without huge administrative difficulties.¹³

46.

The surmise that public perception would respond to inflation is nonetheless probably a sound and useful one. In that case, however, as perception is thought to be “inflation-driven”, the source to which to refer sentencing adjustments in respect of fines need not be changing and nebulous public opinion, but the inflation index which decisively influences that opinion. In short, Sebba Nathan's study leads not so much to a radical “democratic” indexation of sentencing so much as to an affirmation of the wisdom of indexing pecuniary penalties to more readily available, reliable inflation rates. Under such a scheme the requirement of retribution (and of desert) in setting penalties can be respected. So also, broadly speaking, can

those of individual deterrence and of general deterrence (as even when penalty levels are only one of several elements in potential criminals' calculations, it is still as well to maintain their real penal effect).

SECTION 3: STANDARD FINE SYSTEMS

Categories

47.

One of the most common means of indexing fines to inflation in standard fine systems is through the use of categories. Existing fine levels are first brought up to date. Then categories of fine maxima are prescribed, in one of which a place can be found for every monetary fine maximum e.g. in categories of up to £100, up to £500, up to £1,000 and so on. Thereafter, reference is only made to the category; and the monetary maxima which attach to each category can be amended from time to time in a process which is both simple and comprehensive. Such systems have been adopted in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Australian State of Victoria, and proposed in the United States.

The United Kingdom: The Standard Scale

48.

Prior to 1982, the position regarding the calculation of fines in the United Kingdom resembled the present position in Ireland. In the absence of a standard index or table, individual amendment was the only means by which specific fines could be adjusted in order to accommodate changes in the value of money. With the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, an attempt was made to rectify the situation by introducing a general method of indexation.

49.

Presenting the Criminal Justice Bill for its second reading before the House of Commons, Mr. William Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, explained both the nature of the problem and the proposed solution:

Section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982² provides:

50.

The standard scale establishes a limited number of maximum fines fixed at present day values. Each maximum is categorised and the range of categories is designed to reflect and accommodate the gravity of individual offences Minor offences may be expected to attract fines within the ambit of Level 1, for example, while fines calculated to fall under Level 5 may be imposed for the most serious offences for which a monetary penalty is an appropriate sanction. The gravity of the offence is measured by the amount of the fine as originally stated in the offence-creating statute, taking into account the value of money at the time of enactment. Once an offence is identified as a Level 2 offence, for example, the amount of any subsequent fine is calculated by reference to the Level 2 maximum, as it exists at the time of sentencing. While the monetary value of the fine may be expected gradually to increase with time, the classification of the offence will remain the same.

51.

Fluctuations in the value of money will lead to adjustments in the standard scale so that the amounts specified in Column 2 constantly reflect present day monetary values. To maintain the effectiveness of the standard scale in this regard, provision was made in the Criminal Justice Act 1982 for a complementary mechanism to update those monetary amounts. The Secretary of State is empowered under section 143 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980³ to issue an order altering the amounts listed in Column 2 of the standard scale, to meet with change in the value of money. An increase in the statutory maxima was in fact made in 1984.⁴

52.

In addition, it was necessary to devise a means of assimilating existing individual fines to the standard scale. This was done by means of a table not dissimilar to that described below. In this respect, the draughtsmen of the 1982 Act avoided the cumbersome task of updating every such fine in some form of comprehensive, detailed schedule.⁵ To a large extent this was unnecessary since a broad spectrum of offences had been updated by individual amendment in the years immediately preceding the introduction of the 1982 Act

53.

Sections 30 and 31 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provided for increases in fines for a substantial number of summary offences listed in Schedule 6 to the Act. Section 32 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, established a “prescribed sum” for penalties on summary conviction for offences triable either way. The prescribed sum was originally set at £1,000, but has been increased to £2,000 by order of the Secretary of State,⁶ pursuant to his power to alter specified sums under section 143 of the same Act. References to “statutory maximum” in the Criminal Justice Act 1982, are interpreted as meaning “prescribed sum” in accordance with section 32 of the 1980 Act.

54.

The 1982 Act catches all other fines which have not been updated by the Criminal Law Act 1977 or by subsequent legislation. Section 38 of the 1982 Act provides for a general increase in existing maximum fines for summary offences. Where a relevant enactment refers to a fine or maximum fine of the same monetary value as one of the figures in Column 2 of the standard scale, a simple substitution is required. Section 46 provides for the insertion of the corresponding category number in Column 1 for the amount of the fine specified in the statute. The penalty is subsequently fixed by reference to the standard maximum for that level on the standard scale.

55.

Where the amount of the existing statutory fine differs, it is increased, so as to bring it in line with the closest greater amount in Column 2 of the standard scale. Section 38 provides:

Section 39 of the Act deals with special cases to which section 38 does not apply. In respect of these offences, the fines remain at their existing levels or are subject to special increases. Section 40 provides for a general increase of fines under subordinate instruments, in similar fashion to section 38

56.

Overall, this system of indexation has the merit of being relatively simple. The determination of present-day maxima does not require any significant element of mathematical calculation on the part of the judge. By merely altering the amounts of maximum fines, the scheme does not in any way effect present sentencing procedure per se, nor impair the existing discretion which judges enjoy regarding the assessment of what constitutes a suitable sanction in the individual case.

57.

The efficacy of the standard scale is dependent upon an accurate assessment, at the outset, of the number and range of categories which are required adequately to encompass the varying levels of fine, currently in existence. It is obviously advisable to avoid unnecessary complexities. Nevertheless, there is a danger that over-simplification, leading to a limitation in the range of maxima available, may result in some disparity in the fixing of fines. Owing to the simple nature of the scheme in general, it is important that the standard scale be regarded as a table of general maxima and not as a series of precisely tabled calculations.

58.

The existence of a mechanism for the continual and effective updating of the standard scale itself is, of course, vital. It is also essential, in the first instance, that existing statutory maxima are assimilated to the standard scale. In this regard, the process of increasing fines employed in the English legislation seems unnecessarily complicated and fragmented. There is some evidence, indeed, that the UK method of restoring the value of fine maxima unaffected by the Acts of 1977 and 1980 is not very accurate, or at least is not directly applicable to Irish circumstances, as many legislative maxima have been left unamended in this jurisdiction for inordinate periods, and to a degree far greater than in Britain. A maximum fine of £100 prescribed in

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1962 should in 1984 have been worth some £900,⁷ and in 1990 over £1300.⁸ Yet under the UK Scheme, as set out in s38 of the Act of 1982, such a 1962 fine could have increased to a maximum of £400. Such an outcome is hardly satisfactory in a system designed to maintain fine values. The creation of a table, identifying changes in the value of money and covering a timespan which encompasses all existing enactments, would constitute a far more sensible approach. Future changes in the value of money could be accommodated by extending the table periodically, the present-day figures on the table representing the current amounts on the standard scale.⁹

Australia: Penalty Units

59.

The Australian Law Reform Commission, in its recent Report on Sentencing¹⁰ examined the problem of inflation eroding the value of fines. It noted that in every jurisdiction in Australia, it has been necessary to update fines by regularly amending each piece of offence-creating legislation.¹¹ Accordingly, the Commission recommended that a more efficient method of adjusting fines, known as the “penalty unit” system should be enacted for both federal and Australian Capital Territory offences.¹²

60.

The penalty unit system was introduced in Victoria in 1981. Monetary maxima for fines were replaced by a specified number of penalty units, varying in amount according to the seriousness of the offence. The value of the penalty unit, which is currently set at £100,¹³ is fixed by legislation and can be constantly updated. The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission has proposed that a similar scheme be introduced in Tasmania.¹⁴

61.

One problem with the Victorian innovation is its piecemeal approach. The Penalties and Sentences Act 1981 (the relevant legislation) applies to some 400 offences under 56 previous Acts, but this number is just a fraction of the thousands of offences in existence in Victorian law.¹⁵

62.

A system was established by which fines could be up-dated. This was not based on a “value of money” indexation. Rather, the accompanying prison sentence was taken as the measure of gravity, with the fine being adjusted accordingly. One month's imprisonment is equivalent to 5 units, six months'

to 25, and so on.¹⁶ The reason why this system is not of universal application to all Victorian criminal law is that the level of penalties must be examined by the Attorney General in each case before the 1981 Act can apply. Clearly, this is a long and cumbersome task. While there may be a case for such a review of Irish penalties and the varying gravity thereof, it cannot be recommended as a preliminary step to an indexation process. If anything, the reverse should be the case, penalties being reviewed in the light of their newly restored impact on offenders.

The Netherlands: Categories

63.

A committee was instituted by the Dutch Minister for Justice in 1966 (the van Binsbergen Committee) to advise on possible amendments to the law relating to fines. It referred to a situation similar to that pertaining in Ireland at the present: repeated amendments to the Criminal Code had resulted in chaos, “a patchwork made up from literally hundreds of pieces, over large parts of which other patches have been sewn. It is high time (the Committee added) for this to be jettisoned because no reasonable purpose is served by such a situation”¹⁷ The Committee resolved to adopt throughout the Code the generic maxima, collectively assigned to broad categories, which existed in respect of economic offences:- a classical category system in which the appropriate adjustments to inflation can be made by amending one statutory article only.¹⁸

64.

This scheme was enacted in 1983, in the context of a general reform of the Penal Code. Article 23 of the Code runs as follows:

65.

All offences can be punished by a fine, including murder. However, there are no offences for which a fine in the sixth category has been fixed. This category is reserved for legal persons, ie. corporations, which cannot be imprisoned, and the scale of whose operations may necessitate the imposition of an especially heavy fine. The merits of this provision will be discussed below.

66.

All offences were reviewed and placed in a suitable category. This did not involve any re-examination of the gravity of offences.

Belgium: Multipliers

67.

In Belgium the impact of inflation on fines is avoided by use of a system which applies multipliers to all fines prescribed in the Belgian Penal Code. The law of 5th March 1952 is applicable.²⁰

68.

The effect of the present provision (effective from 8th January 1990) is to add to every prescribed fine 790 decimals, or tenths, of the original amount. This allows one simply to multiply it by 80. Formerly, the multiplier was 60 (i.e. 590 decimals were added).²¹

69.

From the limited information available, the Belgian system does not appear to be suitable for Irish purposes. The application of a single multiplier across the board seems to be based upon the assumption that existing fine levels are fairly consistent (and thus fairly uniformly under valued). Precisely the opposite assumption must inform any system adopted in this jurisdiction, that fines prescribed at various times correlate badly not only with present money values, but also with each other. The Belgian scheme, thus, performs only the same task as a category system and seems the less appealing of the two options. The subjection of fines still expressed in legislation in now minuscule amounts to a changing multiplier is rather an abstract process. The characterisation of offences, and corresponding penalties, as category one, two, or otherwise, will probably evoke greater public identification and familiarity with the system. The changing levels of category maxima would also, conceivably, become fairly common public knowledge. In other respects also, category systems are preferable. Fine categories, and occasional changes therein, can be readily assimilated and justified by the judiciary. While the use of a multiplier is a simple operation, the increase several-fold by the maximum penalty stated in the relevant legislation might be mystifying for the convicted offender and the public alike. A category system is therefore to be favoured over multipliers of the Belgian type.

Proposals

70.

A category system is our preferred form of standard fine indexation. It was remarked above, however, that the means of bringing fines up to date in Britain, so that a category system might apply thereafter, would be less than satisfactory if implemented in Ireland.

71.

How does one get everything into line before implementing a category system? Tables of relative money values exist going back beyond 1922 well into the last century (though they become less reliable as one goes further back). The main table is published quarterly in the Statistical Bulletin based on a 1914 index of 100.²² Pre-1914 tables also exist,²³ but these indicate why the problem has only fairly recently become acute – changes in money values before 1914 were so slight that for present purposes they can probably be disregarded.

72.

There could be a system whereby one would arrive at an appropriate sum as follows: A £10 fine is provided for in the Act of 1928; using the table we find that the relationship in the value of money between 1928 and 1989 is in the proportion 177:5,335; £10 then is equivalent now to

£10 x 5,335 ÷ 177 = £301²⁴

But even if every District Justice was equipped with a pocket calculator this would be impracticable. The scope for error in a busy courtroom, even in such a simple calculation, is considerable, which could give rise to irksome appeals. Such a process must necessarily be difficult of comprehension for the defendant and onlookers. In any event, the degree of mathematical exactitude which such a system would achieve, while desirable in tax computations, seems unnecessary in the criminal sphere.

73.

A simpler system which we favour, would work as follows.²⁵ First, one would have only a limited number of possible maximum fines. For example, it might be decided that three levels was adequate. These could, be fixed in present day values at (a) not more than, say, £100 (for relatively trivial offences), (b) £500 (more serious offences) and (c) £1,500 (the most serious). These one would call categories A, B, and C. The sums fixed would not, of course, stand for all time but a mechanism to update the values of each category would be fixed.

74.

The next step is to decide to which category to assign each existing maximum fine, so as to arrive at the appropriate level of fine. Again, mathematical exactitude is not required and it is probably not necessary to deal individually with each Act. From looking at the tables we see that roughly speaking the value of money has halved since 1980, decreased four times since 1975, decreased ten times since 1964, decreased twenty times since 1942, and decreased fifty times since 1914. A maximum fine of £100 today therefore equates to a maximum fine of £50 in 1980, £25 in 1975, £10 in 1964, £5 in 1942 and £2.00 in 1914. In the century before 1914 prices were very stable.

75.

Using this logic we can construct a table which enables us to assign any maximum fine in any piece of legislation to its appropriate category, as in the following example:

Table D

The appropriate category is fixed by reading the level of fine opposite the date of the Act in which it is contained and seeing into which category it falls.

76.

The table can, of course, be made much more exact and elaborate, but it is suggested that too much elaboration is undesirable and unnecessary. In some cases, the bands of time can be quite wide because money values were quite stable. With our recent experience of inflation we can find it hard to remember how recent a phenomenon this is. Between 1815 and 1914 money values hardly changed at all. Inflation really only began to take off seriously in the late 60's and became extreme in the 70's and 80's. Even our present “low” inflation is higher than in all but a few of the years before 1970.

77.

There would be advantages in picking “memorable” dates for the time bands even at the expense of loss of financial exactitude since it would be of

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advantage to practitioners to be able to remember the categories into which fines fell without always having to check the table. The fixing of levels of fines by the Dail or Westminster has never been an exact science in any event.

78.

We consider that, rather than having the table enacted to be referred to by judges and practitioners (and to mystify others as any multiplier system must), the table should be used to update and categorise every single fine “up front” in a statute with long schedules. Thereafter, a ministerial order could increase category maxima with ease. Nor would such a process necessarily be a mammoth task. Subject to ascertaining the existence of the offences, the dates of their creation and the penalties then fixed, hundreds of fines could be recalculated and placed in the appropriate categories in a single working day – provided, that is, that the opportunity was not taken at the same time to reconsider the gravity of offences (a step disapproved of above). A category system on the lines of that in Britain could then run smoothly; judges, practitioners, offenders and the public alike would be presented with clear fine maxima requiring no further legislation; and there would be the added benefit that almost all sentencing provisions in the Irish criminal law would be “codified” in a single piece of legislation. (It might be possible to “restate” non-pecuniary penalties in the same legislation, in order to complete that codification process. New offences and penalties might be added to the schedule as enacted, so that it would always be comprehensive).

79.

Against such an approach, it could be said that the labour involved in codifying the vast numbers of criminal offences now in existence would hardly be repaid by the benefit resulting. Few statutes nowadays, no matter what their subject matter, fail to establish criminal offences, be it in company law, consumer law and so on. There must however be a number of offences regularly prosecuted in the courts, in respect of which it would be wasteful of court time (and an invitation to occasional error) to have judges having daily recourse to the tables. Perhaps the fine maxima for such regular offences could be expressly updated according to the proposed scheme, without prejudice to the application of the same revaluation mechanism to all other fine maxima as they arise in court.

If a standard fine approach is to be adopted, such an approach is recommended.

Implementation of Proposals

80.

The precise means of implementing such a scheme remain to be considered, as certain constitutional issues intervene under the rubric of Article 15.2, which states:

81.

The delegation of legislation under Article 15.2.2 is supervised by the courts. The decision in Pigs Marketing Board v Donnelly²⁶ gave an indication of the latitude which would be allowed to experts employed by the Executive in formulating rules in matters of detail. Relating to the setting of a hypothetical trade price, Hanna J remarked in the High Court:

A similar conclusion – that it was futile to ask the legislature to fix the amount of prices or levies which must be based on complex calculations about market conditions and needs – was drawn by the Supreme Court in City View Press v AnCO.²⁸

82.

That case concerned levies prescribed by the Industrial Training Act 1967, the extent of their application to various sectors of industry being decided by AnCO. O'Higgins CJ, for the Court outlined a test: one must ask if the power delegation is more than a mere giving effect to principles and policies contained in the statute itself. The Act in that case contained clear declarations of aims and policies, and established machinery for their achievement. “The only matter which is left for determination by AnCO is the manner of calculating this levy in relation to a particular industry. This is doing no more than adding the final detail which brings into operation the general law which is laid down in the section”.²⁹

83.

Stout summarises the criteria as being very similar to those pertaining in the US:

This jurisprudence has been outlined because it is essential that the implementation of any indexation system comply with it. Two recent cases may shed light on how the principle will be enforced by the courts.

84.

Hogan & Morgan expressed in 1986 their scepticism as to the invulnerability of s1 of the Imposition of Duties Act 1957 to constitutional challenge. That section empowers the Government to impose customs duties by statutory order, with or without qualifications or limitations, “of such amount as they think proper”. This, they submitted, goes well beyond giving effect to statutory principles and policies, and appears to allow the Government to amend legislation, and to levy taxes by executive decree.³¹ This point was raised in McDaid v Sheehy,³² in which the applicant sought to quash his conviction under the Imposition of Duties (No. 221) (Excise Duties) Order, 1975 by inter alia challenging the constitutionality of s1 of the 1957 Act. Blayney J in the High Court found the Order to be applicable because it had been confirmed by s46 of the Finance Act 1976, and so had legislative authorisation. Nonetheless, he found the Act to be unconstitutional. Citing the decision in City View, he stated that the Oireachtas under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution must provide a scheme of principles and policy in the primary legislation so that the vires of secondary legislation could be tested. Otherwise, the Oireachtas's authorisation was unconstitutional. This Blayney J found to be the case in respect of the 1957 Act – s1 gave the executive an entirely free hand and should therefore be struck down.

85.

Byrne and Binchy remark that these comments should be treated as obiter, on the principle that constitutional questions should be addressed only where they are necessary to a decision.³³ This was also the opinion of the Supreme Court majority on appeal. Given that the 1975 Order derived its validity as of 1976 from the Finance Act of that year, the applicant could not be prejudiced or damaged by any provision of the Act of 1957, and the Court declined to pronounce on the constitutional validity of the impugned section.³⁴

Blayney J's comments and conclusions are not therefore of binding legal effect, but they are still indicative of judicial thinking. However, in a case decided in the Supreme Court between his decision and that on the appeal in McDaid, a somewhat different approach was manifested. In Harvey v Minister for Social Welfare,³⁵the constitutional validity of s75(1) of the Social Welfare Act 1952 (ss310–12 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1981) was contested. The section makes provision for “adjusting” any benefits, allowances, etc where two or more are payable to one person. Here also there was found to be delegated to the Government “an unfettered discretion”,³⁶ but the Supreme Court took as its starting point the presumption of constitutionality described in East Donegal Co-operative. One had to assume that the Oireachtas intended the powers conferred on the respondent Minister by s75(1) of the 1952 Act to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. It was held that the provision was not such as to make it necessary or inevitable that the Minister would make a regulation which was in breach of Article 15.2 of the Constitution “The wide scope and unfettered discretion contained in the section can clearly be exercised by a Minister making regulations so as to ensure that what is done is truly regulatory or administrative only and does not constitute the making, repealing or amending of law in a manner which would be invalid having regard to the provisions of the Constitution”³⁷

86.

In fact, the regulation in question³⁸ was held invalid because it negatived the intention of the legislature as expressed in s7 of the Social Welfare Act 1979. Article 15.2 of the Constitution can be used to restrain rather than to invalidate an open-ended legislative delegation of powers. Thus, it is regulations which are more than merely regulatory in effect which will be struck down, rather than the Act which ostensibly permits this. This is probably a salutary change of emphasis, it in no way undermines the separation of powers, but rather upholds it by less drastic means.

87.

Whether the primary or the secondary legislation would be struck down, it is in any event apparent that “legislative” regulations are to be avoided. Even a limited provision, directing the Minister for Justice to raise fine category levels in accordance with inflation (presuming all fines had been initially updated by statute) might be suspect, simply because academic opinion may vary on the correct meaning of that term Rather, the means employed in the Capital Gains Tax (Amendment) Act 1978 are to be preferred Section 3(1) of that Act³⁹ gives full guidelines on how indexation multipliers are to be derived from the Consumer Price Index. It is further provided that

regulations be issued specifying the multipliers determined in accordance with subsection (1). The Consumer Price Index is defined. Thus, only the compilation of the CPI, and its application in a prescribed fashion, remain the responsibility of the executive – which conforms to the practice of leaving such matters of detail to experts, for the purpose of effectuating principles and policies contained in the statute itself. We favour this approach.

88.

Similarly, we favour an approach whereby statutory provision is made for the periodic review of fine category levels (e.g. every four years); or for their increase whenever the previous figure became devalued by, say, 10%, as calculated from CPI/relative money values. The formulae described above would be employed, and the executive function would then be purely instrumental;⁴⁰ no danger of unconstitutionality should then exist.

The USA and Australia: Proposals and Special Schemes

89.

A hybrid category system has been proposed for the United States in the Model Penal Code. Section 6.03 sets specific dollar limits for each degree of felony and misdemeanour. Additionally, it provides for the increase of fines in line with the proceeds of crime;

The Model Penal Code thus seems to adopt a standard scale approach – in 1968, its primary function was not to respond to inflation, but it could easily be employed to do so. Unlike the position here, the degrees of felony and misdemeanour have maintained their significance, as is illustrated by section 1.04 of the relevant title and chapter of the draft Code.⁴¹

90.

The Model Penal Code is of more interest for the way in which it deals with two problems outlined above, which can elude solution by a simple index: those of vast business offenders, and of exorbitant criminal proceeds. This is done by prescribing, in addition to the normal fine, an exaction of up to twice the proceeds of the particular crime. A similar course of action was recommended by the America Bar Association:

91.

Similar steps have been taken in Australia. In addition to the Victoria measures described above, some 200 provisions have been enacted in Victoria and Australian Commonwealth law providing that fines for the relevant offences be computed with reference to the quantum of damage caused by the extent of the financial obligations breached. This has been done with very little consistency. Ordinarily, the fine is the value of the property, etc. involved plus a further amount not exceeding a maximum. This is sometimes coupled with a minimum penalty. The fine is generally expressed in taxation cases as a percentage or multiple of the amount evaded. Very infrequently, a ratio is set (usually fixed, but sometimes variable) between some quantifiable aspect of the subject matter of the offence and the penalty to be exacted.⁴²

46.

Such a situation is obviously and undesirably confused. Nonetheless, all of the American and Australian provisions here described embody a single principle: that the problem we are addressing be dealt with by confiscation of some fraction or multiple of criminal proceeds.⁴³ The Dutch approach already remarked upon is different. It is designed to deal with corporations so large that even a heavy fine would be meaningless, by providing that such legal persons be subject to fines one category above those normally applicable in any case. Sharples points out the van Binsbergen Committee's reasoning:

93.

It will be remembered that when the issue was discussed above, the two problems were stated separately: coping with large-scale offences is not precisely equivalent to the task of dealing with large-scale offenders, though the two will often overlap. We therefore recommend that both approaches be adopted in some form within a category or standard scale system. General provisions of both types would sit equally well in a multiplier system. The model we favour would thus involve the imposition on legal persons of a certain size of fines of the category immediately above that ordinarily applicable to the offence in question.

SECTION 4: SENTENCING THEORY AND VARIABLE FINES

94.

Any one considering various sentencing theories in respect of fines will come upon a conflict between two principles of equality.¹

95.

One is the principle of equality of impact. The same penalty can have radically different effects on various individuals. This can be true of all penalties, including imprisonment, but it is especially the case with relation to fines. Personal financial circumstances can differ enormously, and so, therefore, can the impact of a fine of a fixed monetary amount. “It is as if the rate of income tax were the same for all, instead of the graduated scale of taxation which has come to be widely accepted”.²

96.

If one attributes more importance to the notions of desert and proportionality than to the more uncertain benefits of general deterrence, what should matter in sentencing is not consistency of penal measures, but rather consistency of penal effect.³ Such consistency may require fining the poor man £10, and the rich man £1,000, for offences of the same gravity: hence the variable fine systems which are now to be discussed.

97.

Quite obviously opposed to this is the principle of equality before the law – that no one should suffer disadvantage before the law on the basis of his race, gender, religion, social background or means Few would deny such a principle, and it is difficult to contest that it should protect the rich as much

as the poor. Thus, while in Markwick's Case⁴ it led Lord Goddard CJ to sentence a wealthy man to 2 months' imprisonment rather than a £500 fine, so that there might be no suggestion that the rich could buy themselves out of being sent to prison, the principle has more often worked to prevent the imposition of higher than normal fines on the rich in an attempt to achieve some equality of impact. In England section 35 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 requires those courts (and a similar obligation is placed on Crown Courts) to consider inter alia the means of the person so far as known to the court. The English Court of Appeal has held, however, that means should be considered only after a decision on the amount of the fine, on the basis of the gravity of the offence, so that while the fine may be reduced for the poor, higher fines for the rich are excluded.⁵

98.

It is submitted that the principle of equality before the law strictu senso should primarily be considered a procedural rule, linked to due process. In respect of substantive issues, like sentencing, a different idea of equality might serve better: that equality not only involves treating like cases alike, but also treating different cases differently. The English provision for that principle, in respect of sentencing, was until recently half-hearted and lopsided, making allowances for poverty but not for wealth, and applying in an entirely discretionary fashion.

99.

However, whether equality of impact is capable of practical achievement is another question, which brings us to consider the merits of variable fine systems. It is worthwhile bearing in mind, given the brief of this Report, that one of their great advantages is the ease with which they can accommodate inflationary pressures.

Germany and Sweden – The Day Fine System⁶

100.

Fines are directly addressed in Chapter 25 of the Swedish Penal Code which came into force on 1st January 1965 and was amended on 1st January 1972. The Code establishes three types of fines: monetary fines, day fines, and standardised fines.⁷ Monetary fines are imposed for lesser offences such as drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and minor traffic infringements. Standardised fines, which are fixed on a special basis of computation, are primarily applied in cases of tax evasion and of offences regarding trade and

industry.⁸

101.

The overwhelming majority of fines are imposed in the form of day fines. In fact, the day fines system pre-dated the enactment of the Penal Code. A day fine mechanism was in operation in Finland as early as 1921.⁹

102.

In the day fine system, the number of day fines represents the measure of punishment, and the amount of each day fine is estimated in accordance with the financial situation of the accused. The day fine is calculated by multiplying these two numbers together. These two factors are assessed independently of each other.

103.

Van Kalmthout and Tak describe the process which is used to calculate the offender's means and therefore the value of a “day”.

Whatever the result of these calculations, however, there is a minimum “day” of 10 Kronor, and a maximum of 1,000.

104.

Reductions may be made where the offender has a dependent spouse and for each of the offender's children. There are also provisions providing for adjustments in the amount of day fines in specific cases. For example, the fine may be reduced where the offender has large debts, or where the offender is a married woman without an independent income, and increased where the offender has capital over 30,000 Kronor.¹¹

105.

The number of day fines imposed is determined by an evaluation of the gravity of the offence. The more serious the nature of the offence, the greater

the number of day fines imposed. The minimum number of day fines is 1 and the maximum 120, although in special cases, for example involving multiple offences, the maximum may be increased to 180. The highest sum which can be imposed, therefore, is 120,000 Kronor (120 x 1,000 Kronor) for a single offence, and 180,000 Kronor (180 x 1,000 Kronor) for multiple offences. In the German case, the Criminal Code mandates that both the number of day fine units and the value of each unit be published in the court's decision.¹²

106.

Thus the composition of the fine is transparent. A Report of the British Advisory Council on the Penal System described the manner in which Swedish courts assess the offender's financial means:

107.

However, the successful operation of the German scheme depends upon voluntary disclosure of personal financial means by the offender. The authorities have no right of access to an individual's taxation records and the offender cannot be forced to divulge information revealing his ability to pay.¹⁴

108.

The bulk of Swedish day fines are in fact determined by public prosecutors, who can invite the offender to accept a fine, rather than be prosecuted in court.¹⁵ This process has the same legal effect as sentencing by a court, but prosecutors cannot impose more than 50 day fines (60 in the case of multiple offences).¹⁶

109.

While a day fine mechanism such as the Swedish model is primarily designed to relate the amount of the fine to the offender's ability to pay, this

very process allows the system to keep pace with changing money values. While raising fines in real terms (e.g. to increase deterrence or retribution) can be achieved by altering either the number of days which can be imposed for various offences or the fraction of income which constitutes one “day”, no such changes are necessary simply to maintain the penal impact of fines. Just as the system is tailored to adjust to variations in income over the spectrum of classes, so it can also adjust to income differences over time. Admittedly, it is a response to changes in nominal income levels rather than to inflation rates, but this is consistent with the individualised nature of the day fine mechanism.¹⁷ The considerations which dictated the choice of the inflation rate as an index over national disposable income do not apply here.

110.

One solitary amendment might be necessary, to the minimum and maximum levels of fines, so that the operation of the day fine process would not be too much circumscribed by outdated financial limits. That the Swedish system was not as resilient as the above paragraph suggests is possible is evident from the necessity of replacing the Chief Public Prosecutors' circularised sentencing guidelines of 1963 in 1973.¹⁸ The precise deficiencies of the system in this respect are not clear from the literature published in English. It is evident, however, that were a limited day fine system to be adopted – one which placed individuals in broad income categories for “day” calculation purposes, rather than always calculating from their precise income the categories employed would have to be reviewed from time to time in line with inflation or changes in income levels. That judges and prosecutors would adopt such a categorising approach in practice is highly probable, it is thought: but where this is only informal (and its legislative adoption is not recommended), it is likely that it would be altered spontaneously in the light of relevant changes. Arguments do exist, however, and are rehearsed below, for the legislative adoption of a maximum unit value, and this would have to be altered periodically.

111.

It is said that the day fine system has been endorsed in Sweden by the judiciary and public alike and that in addition, the wide discretion which it creates to tailor the fine to the individual case does not result in any marked disparity in sentencing practice.¹⁹ It has been observed that in practice, “the apportionment of day fines has a tendency to be made according to a set of patterns when the prosecutors and the courts are dealing with offences of the more frequent types”.²⁰

112.

One further positive feature of the day fine system should be noted. As was suggested above, as the value of fines maxima is eroded, their relationship not only with the gravity of offences but also with imprisonment provisions is distorted. Both the Swedish and German variable fine systems provide for this. While it is rare for a short-term prison sentence to be available as an alternative to a fine (particularly in Germany), tables are set out for the conversion of fines to prison terms in cases of default. In Sweden, the conversion is done according to a sliding scale, which again is almost inflation-proof because stated in terms of “days”. 5 day fines are converted to 10 days imprisonment, 100 day fines to 64 days', 120 day fines to 70 days' and 180 day fines' to 90 days' imprisonment.²¹ In Germany, the fine may be converted into a prison sentence at the “exchange rate” of one day in prison for each day fine unit.²²

113.

It has been suggested in many quarters that default imprisonment should be abolished, not least in Sweden.²³ But should it be maintained, it is as well that it should be implemented in a consistent fashion, as outlined above. Also, the day fine system should ensure that default is kept to an absolute minimum. In Sweden, many default prison terms are suspended, so that (in 1975), of 250,000 fines imposed per annum, fewer than 150 resulted in actual imprisonment: this from a 'high' of 12–13,000 per annum.²⁴ In Germany, offenders serve default prison terms in less than 4% of cases, which Friedman believes results from imposing fines commensurate with offenders' ability to pay.

114.

The Swedish scheme has served as a model for the implementation of similar regimes in other jurisdictions, such as Denmark, where it was introduced in 1939,²⁵ and West Germany in 1975.²⁶ Day fine schemes are currently in operation in a number of countries, including Austria, Hungary, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Bolivia. As of 1984, recommendations had been made for its introduction in Poland and Spain,²⁷ and in Canada.²⁸ A scheme was adopted in France in the 1980's.²⁹ A scheme was also considered for

Scotland,³⁰ and one has now been adopted for the entirety of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom: Proposals and Legislation

115.

The Scottish Home and Health Department's 1988 Consultation Paper, Fines and Fines Enforcement, remarks that a considerable problem of fine default exists in Scotland: while most fines are paid, and fine defaulters account for only 6% of the prison population at any time, they constitute almost 50% of prison admissions.³¹

116.

Section 395(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 requires the court to consider the offender's means so far as they are known to the court (but there is no corresponding obligation of disclosure).³² Section 395A allows the remission of the fine by the court which imposed it or which is responsible for its enforcement. The court cannot, moreover, at the time of imposing the fine, impose imprisonment in the event of a future default unless the offender is before the court, and the court determines that, having regard to the gravity of the offence or the character of the offender, or to some other special reason, it is expedient that in the event of default the offender be imprisoned without further enquiry.

117.

Section 396 of the 1975 Act requires that a court shall, save in certain circumstances, allow an offender at least seven days to pay a fine (or the first instalment thereof); Section 397 allows the offender to apply to the relevant court for further time to pay a fine, which may be granted unless the previous non-payment has been wilful, or the offender has no reasonable prospect of paying even if further time is allowed.

118.

Section 398 applies to those offenders who have not had imprisonment imposed in the event of default at the time of the imposition of the fine, and who fail to pay. In these circumstances the court must enquire in the offender's presence into why the fine has not been paid (although this does not apply if the offender is in prison). The options available to the Means Enquiry Court (MEC) are:- to remit all or part of the fine (under section 395a); to reduce the level of instalments and to extend the period over which they must be paid (under section 399); to order supervision of the fined

person, normally by a local authority social worker, who will assist and advise the offender in regard to payment of the fine. Such supervision must be ordered in the case of a person aged under 21 before detention in default can be imposed (section 400); or to impose a period of imprisonment or detention not to exceed the maximum specified in section 407(1A).

119.

While it is not technically within the brief of this Report, it is thought that the adoption of similar provisions in this jurisdiction would be a salutary measure; this would be especially welcome if a variable fine system were not ultimately to be introduced.

120.

One of the factors impelling consideration of a day fine system in Scotland was precisely the opposite of that which is our chief concern: an analysis of the movement of average fines since 1977 in comparison with the increase in prices (as measured by the Retail Price Index) and average earnings of manual workers in Scotland shows that fines rose much faster than prices and earnings.³³ This factor, together with the unstructured nature of existing means enquiries, led the Department to advocate in the Consultation Paper the introduction of pilot schemes. Some of the arguments in favour of and against day fines which follow in this Report are rehearsed. It adds two further possible cons, though neither seems unsurmountable:

121.

As a result of the responses received to the Consultation Paper, a clause was introduced to what was then the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Bill relating to the experimental day fine proposal. However, it was dropped from the Bill during its passage through the House of Commons.³⁶ A copy of the clause is contained in Appendix V.

122.

The Home Office proposed a day fine system for England and Wales its 1990 White Paper “Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public”.³⁷ As elsewhere, the primary motivation was to achieve equality of penal impact. It was also thought desirable to induce a return to the high level of recourse to fines by courts of the 1970's. Experiments were conducted in four magistrates' courts of which details have since been published. The four areas were Bradford, Basingstoke, Teeside and Swansea. It is noted in the White Paper that magistrates who were sceptical at the start came to take a positive view.³⁸

123.

Evaluation was confined to 17 offence categories. Almost 7,000 cases in which unit fines were imposed were compared to more than 6,000 in which fines were imposed under the traditional system. The experiments were, however, constrained by doubts about imposing larger fines on the better off Courts therefore set local norms for the average weekly disposable income they thought an employed person in their area would have. They would then reduce the fine for anyone they assessed to have less than this norm.³⁹ Nonetheless, in Basingstoke, where the norm was higher than in the other three areas (£20 rather than £10 per week), the better off did pay more than before. In each trial, the minimum unit value was £3. ⁴⁰ The unit used for assessment was a week's disposable income, after deducting tax and necessary living expenses Courts were accustomed to assessing weekly income in determining payments, so this approach fitted better with existing practice. It was also felt that few people think in terms of daily income and expenditure, and those fined would more readily understand a system similar to how they planned their finances. Disposable income was calculated by subtracting from net income an allowance for each person supported by it e.g. £50 for a spouse, £25 for a child, etc.⁴¹ All the courts began with the same form, reproduced in Appendix VI which solicited basic information on income and family commitments, with provision for a submission by the defendant about any special circumstances. In its simplicity, this form was closer to that used to determine eligibility for legal aid than to a detailed means inquiry. One court (Swansea) also sought information on savings and occupation.⁴² It was found that information was made available (without compulsion) in most cases,⁴³ that the simple means forms employed did not greatly affect court workloads, and that the actual arithmetic of calculating times was quite straight forward. Other findings were that the use of fines did not increase, though fine revenues did in Basingstoke, because of the more realistic ceiling

Disparities between courts in fines imposed on poorer offenders were significantly reduced. There was a drop in default imprisonment, and fines were paid more quickly.⁴⁴

124.

The proposals of the White Paper should now be considered. The extension of the unit fine system to legal persons, who see commercial advantages in criminal acts because of the low level of normal fines, was recommended.⁴⁵ Attachment of earnings, or of benefits, was considered a valuable method of enforcing fines,⁴⁶ though disquiet was expressed in the media about automatically deducting sums from social security payments which are already paltry.

125.

What appears to be an irksome limitation is that the monetary value of the fine would have to be within the statutory maximum for each offence.⁴⁷ This will normally be an undesirable step. Fine maxima under present arrangements mark the level of punishment for the most grave manifestation of commission of the relevant offence, not the penalty for the less serious acts of a wealthy offender. Otherwise, the punishment for the most serious transgressions of the well-off would be subject to an unnecessarily low ceiling. Also, these maxima would still need to be updated in accordance with inflation, which would defeat our most immediate purpose. Most such criticisms are defused by the manner in which the proposals have been incorporated in the United Kingdom's Criminal Justice Act 1991 (relevant provisions of which are contained in Appendix VII). The unit fine system has been combined with the scheme of maximum penalties which already existed – an offence's level on the standard scale dictates the number of fine units which can be imposed.⁴⁸ There is a maximum unit value of £100 per week.⁴⁹ No minimum is stated. If it is thought that this maximum is a reasonable one, then the wealthy will not be perceived to get away relatively lightly for their more serious infractions, and such a hybrid scheme may be workable. It will remain necessary, however, periodically to update the standard scale maxima and the unit maximum dictated by them.

126.

Provision is made to compel offenders to furnish the court with a statement of means. It is a summary offence to fail to furnish such a statement; knowingly or recklessly to furnish materially false information; or knowingly to withhold any material information.⁵⁰ Where no statement is furnished, the court may make such determination of the offender's means as

it thinks fit.⁵¹ Provision is also made for default imprisonment, and for the recovery of fines by deductions from income support.⁵²

127.

Markwick's Case is superseded by s17(2) of the new Act. S17 reenacts for cases not embraced by the unit fine scheme the old general rule that the means of the offender be taken into account as far as possible in fixing the amount of fines; subsection 2 adds the rider that this rule applies whether it “has the effect of increasing or reducing the amount of the fine”.

128.

Table E sets out some likely fines for different income groups under the new system.

Table E⁵³

Variable Fine Systems: An Assessment

129.

It remains to be seen how successful variable fine systems are in achieving their aims. The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law investigated the effectiveness of the German measures. Table F indicates a reduction in the number of quite low fines (e.g. a halving in the number of 300 DM fines and a diminution by 1/3 of the number of 400 DM fines), and fines above 1500 DM increased noticeably after the new law took effect. This may be either because the reforms have the desired effect of burdening more affluent offenders with progressively higher fines, or because courts simply started to punish some crimes more severely. The low level of fine default indicates the former, but there is no guarantee that this is done accurately.

Table F

130.

From the above account, the advantages of a day fine system can be summarised as follows:

131.

The objections to variable fine systems are also of some weight.

Table G

Take for example a maximum fine of £100 under the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956. For 1990 that maximum should be increased thus:

100 x 5426 ÷ 420 = c. £1292

Mean disposable income for 1989 could be calculated as follows:

Mean unit value is thus £5,878 / 1,000 = c. £5.90. The unit maximum for the relevant offence under the 1956 Act would then be £1292 / 6.6 = c. 195 units.

Conclusions

132.

Most criticisms of day fine systems can be answered. However, because of what one might consider to be the peculiar circumstances of this jurisdiction, two difficulties of more stubborn mien present themselves. One is practical, relating to the ascertainment of the means of offenders; the other is constitutional, being the problem of the relationship of a day fine system with the regime of summary trial and trial on indictment.

133.

In its favour, it has an inherent capacity to accommodate fluctuations in the value of money, as well as setting out to be absolutely fair in terms of the weight of punishment imposed on each finee. The alternative of a standard fine system, no matter how well designed, must inevitably entail either unnecessary hardship for poorer offenders, or meaningless fines for the more wealthy.¹⁰⁹ Day fines allow the penal impact of fines to be maintained not only over time, but also over socio-economic class. Also, they tend to promote clarity in the sentencing process, and consistency in fining offenders. They allow the extension of fines to more serious offences.

134.

While it is thought that the social and economic advantages of a day fine system would be considerable, the obstacles to its introduction could be unlimited in duration and effect (including the possibility of being found repugnant to the Constitution). The idea was met by considerable reservations on the part of those to whom the earlier Discussion Paper was circulated. Many were of opinion that the practical difficulties posed by the adoption of a variable fine system could be even greater than we surmised. In the light of such responses from professionals working in all parts of the criminal justice system, and of the system's potential practical and constitutional infirmity, we feel unable positively to recommend a variable fine system for this jurisdiction at this stage. We remain confident of its potential merits, however, and suggest that the question be considered again, after a standard fine scheme has been introduced, and in the light, in particular, of British experience.

SECTION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Recommendations

APPENDIX I(i)

TOTAL AMOUNT COLLECTED IN FINES

These figures should not, however, be taken at face value. One factor which must be taken into account is the large amount of fines which go unpaid for long periods. The Department of Justice (which provided the above figures) also supplied the following information:

District Court Offices

Garda Síochána

The throughput of warrants was also monitored from 1987:¹

Nor can the figures for each year for fines collected and warrants unissued simply be added together to get a picture of the value of fines imposed in a particular year, as neither year has any necessary relation with the year of imposition. While most fines are collected within six months of imposition, even then they may appear in the figures for the next year if imposed in the latter half of the year. Clearly, those fines which go uncollected for longer periods make it even more difficult to draw conclusions.

Also, the figures must be seen in the light of changing levels of court business. There was a large jump in convictions in the early 80's, due largely to the computerisation of the summons issuing process (according to Department of Justice Officials): the steep drop in the later years is probably due, in part in any event, the decision in the Senezio case² that the issuing of summonses is a judicial function for which court clerks are not qualified. The total figure for fines imposed, or collected, in each year, will naturally have been influenced by these fluctuations.

SUMMARY OF CASES HEARD IN THE DISTRICT COURTS³

APPENDIX I (ii)

CALCULATED LOSS IN REAL FINE REVENUE

The factors alluded to in Appendix I (i) above make it difficult to calculate with any accuracy the loss of fine revenue in real terms due to inflation. However, if one makes the assumption that the range of penalties available to judges has hardly changed during the 1980's (with the exception of the introduction of Community Service) it is still possible to reach some conclusions. In particular, fine maxima have been static.

We can then take the fine revenue of a particular year eg. 1982, when £3,451,628 was collected. (That year's figures are useful because the problem of staff shortages and unissued warrants was not yet critical). Given inflation over the decade, that sum should be equivalent to £4,602,170 in 1990 values, given a similarly constituted case load. (The fact that much more was collected in 1989 from a similar number of cases, and fines, is immaterial – the proportion of the case-load formed by various offences, or various damages of offence, may have changed; or, more disturbingly, judges may be imposing higher fines despite static maxima, which would, if true, confirm the need for action on this front). If in fact fines were imposed in 1990 for a similar set of cases at the 1982 levels (as they should be, as maxima have not changed), then there is a 33% loss in the revenue over the period, that being the overall rate of inflation for those eight years.¹

Even this calculation assumes that fine levels in 1982 were at their proper value. Given that inflation was much higher in the seventies and early eighties than in the later part of the decade, the situation must be much

worse than described. The loss on a 1970 case-load would be over 700% (the levels of fine maxima not having changed much even since then).

APPENDIX II (i)¹

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

APPENDIX II(ii)

GROSS NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME AND ITS USE

G.N.D.I. for 1989 is estimated to be £21,915,000,000.¹

GROSS NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME AT CONSTANT (1985) MARKET PRICES ADJUSTED FOR TERMS OF TRADE

*Preliminary

APPENDIX II(iii)

PRE-1914 MONEY VALUES

Empirical estimate of the cost of living

(From AL Bowley, “Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since 1860”, at p122).

APPENDIX III:

SOCIAL WELFARE AND INFLATION

INCREASE IN VARIOUS WELFARE RATES 1980 – 1990 SINGLE PERSON/WIDOW – WITHOUT CHILD DEPENDENTS

APPENDIX IV

CAPITAL GAINS TAX (AMENDMENT) ACT 1978 AND TABLE OF MULTIPLIERS

03.

TABLE

Year of assessment in which deductible expenditure incurred (1)	Multiplier (2)
1974–75	1.815
1975–76	1.466
1976–77	1.263
1977–78	1.083

TABLE OF INDEXATION MULTIPLIERS

EXPENDITURE INCURRED IN	MULTIPLIERS
	SALE IN 1978/79	SALE IN 1979/80	SALE IN 1980/81	SALE IN 1981/82	SALE IN 1982/83
Year to 5/4/75 or any earlier year*	1815	2012	2324	2812	3342
Year to 5/4/76 (1975/76)	1466	1625	1877	2271	2699
Year to 5/4/77 (1976/77)	1263	1400	1617	1956	2325
Year to 5/4/78 (1977/78)	1083	1200	1386	1677	1993
Year to 5/4/79 (1978/79)	–	1109	1231	1549	1842
Year to 5/4/80 (1979/80)	–	–	1155	1398	1662
Year to 5/4/81 (1980/81)	–	–	–	1210	1439
Year to 5/4/82 (1981/82)	–	–	–	–	1189
	SALE IN 1983/84	SALE IN 1984/85	SALE IN 1985/86	SALE IN 1986/87	SALE IN 1987/88
Year to 5/4/75 or any earlier year*	3759	4140	4397	4598
Year to 5/4/76 (1975/76)	3306	3344	3561	3714
Year to 5/4/77 (1976/77)	2615	2881	3059	3200
Year to 5/4/78 (1977/78)	2242	2470	2623	2743
Year to 5/4/79 (1978/79)	2071	2282	2423	2534
Year to 5/4/80 (1979/80)	1868	2059	2186	2286
Year to 5/4/81 (1980/81)	1618	1782	1893	1979
Year to 5/4/82 (1981/82)	1337	1473	1564	1636
Year to 5/4/83 (1982/83)	1125	1239	1316	1376
Year to 5/4/84 (1983/84)	–	1102	1170	1224
Year to 5/4/85 (1984/85)	–	–	1062	1111
Year to 5/4/86 (1985/86)	–	–	–	1046

APPENDIX V

DRAFT SCOTTISH DAY FINE CLAUSE

51.

After section 412 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 there shall be inserted the following section –

APPENDIX VI

Means Enquiry Form, English Unit Fine Trials.¹

If convicted, the court may impose a financial penalty (a fine or compensation). The court would set the level of the fine partly according to the seriousness of the offence and partly in relation to your means. It helps if the court has a statement of your means which can either be sent in advance of the hearing or brought with you when you attend court. Please answer the questions below even if you intend to plead not guilty.

1. Full name Mr / Mrs / Miss / Ms
2. What is your total income from:–	Week / Month
Take-home earnings (i.e. after tax but including overtime, bonuses, etc.)	£
State benefit (after deductions) DO NOT INCLUDE CHILD BENEFIT	£
Other (specify)	£
3. What is the take-home income	Week / Month
of your spouse / partner?	£
4. Does anyone else contribute to your household?	YES / NO
If YES, how much have they given in the last 4 weeks / month?	£
5. How many people do you support?	Children
	Adults

6. Do you have any outstanding fines or compensation to pay?	YES / NO
How much are you paying each week?	£
When will payment be completed?
7. Please state amount of any maintenance paid to anyone living outside your household.	£
8. If a fine is imposed, at what weekly rate could you pay it?	£
9. If there are any other exceptional outgoings, either write them on the back of this form or on another piece of paper.

You should bring to court any documents, such as pay slips, to back up the information given in this form.

Date Signature

APPENDIX VII

U.K. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1991 (RELEVANT EXTRACTS)

Fixing of certain fines by reference to units

16.

–

Fixing of fines in other cases

17.

–

Statements as to offenders' means.

18.

–